We consider revenue maximization in online auctions and pricing. A seller sells an identical item in each period to a new buyer, or a new set of buyers. For the online posted pricing problem, we show regret bounds that scale with the best xed price, rather than the range of the values. We also show regret bounds that are almost scale free, and match the o ine sample complexity, when comparing to a benchmark that requires a lower bound on the market share. ese results are obtained by generalizing the classical learning from experts and multi-armed bandit problems to their multi-scale versions. In this version, the reward of each action is in a di erent range, and the regret w.r.t. a given action scales with its own range, rather than the maximum range. 2 We conjecture that the lower bound for the posted pricing problem should be worse by a factor of ϵ −1 , since one needs to explore about ϵ −1 di ernet prices. 3 When the values are in [1, h], we can guarantee a revenue of T by posting a price of 1, and to beat this, any other price (and in particular a price of h) would have to sell at least T /h times. 4 Unfortunately, we cannot yet guarantee that our online algorithm itself gets a market share of δ , although we strongly believe that it does. Showing such bounds on the market share of the algorithm is an important avenue for future research.
INTRODUCTION
Consider the following revenue maximization problem in a repeated se ing, called the online posted pricing problem. In each period, the seller has a single item to sell, and a new prospective buyer. e seller o ers to sell the item to the buyer at a given price; the buyer buys the item if and only if the price is below his private valuation for the item. e private valuation of the buyer itself is never revealed to the seller. How should a monopolistic seller iteratively set the prices if he wishes to maximize his revenue? What if he also cares about market share?
Estimating price sensitivities and demand models in order to optimize revenue and market share is the bedrock of econometrics. e emergence of online marketplaces has enabled sellers to costlessly change prices, as well as collect huge amounts of data. is has renewed the interest in understanding best practices for data driven pricing. e extreme case of this when the price is updated for each buyer is the online pricing problem described above; one can always use this for less frequent price updates. Moreover this problem is intimately related to classical experimentation and estimation procedures.
is problem has been studied from an online learning perspective, as a variant of the multi-armed bandit problem. e revenue of a pricing algorithm is compared to the revenue of the best xed posted price, in hindsight, and the di erence between the two, called the regret, is analyzed. No assumption is made on the distribution of values; the regret bounds are required to hold for the worst case sequence of values. Blum et al. [10] assume that the buyer valuations are in [1, h] , and show the following multiplicative + additive bound on the regret: for any ϵ ∈ (0, 1), the regret is at most ϵ times the revenue of the optimal price, + O (ϵ −2 h log h log log h). Blum and Hartline [9] show that the additive factor can be made to be O (ϵ −3 h log log h), trading o a log h factor for an extra ϵ −1 factor. An undesirable aspect of these bounds is that they scale linearly with h; this is particularly problematic when h is an estimate and we might set it to be a generous upper bound on the range of prices we wish to consider. A typical use case is when the same algorithm is used for many di erent products, with widely varying price ranges. We may not be able to manually tune the range for each product separately.
is dependency on h seems unavoidable, as is re ected by the lower bounds for the problem. (Lower bounds are discussed later in the introduction.) Yet, somewhat surprisingly, our rst contribution in this paper is to show that we can replace h by the best xed price 1 (that is used in the de nition of the benchmark). In particular, we show that the additive bound can be made to be O (ϵ −2 p * log h), where p * is the best xed price in hindsight. is allows us to use a very generous estimate for h; we only lose a log h factor. e algorithm balances exploration probabilities of di erent prices carefully and automatically zooms in on the relevant price range.
is does not violate known lower bounds, since in those instances p * is close to h. Bar-Yossef et al. [7] , Blum et al. [10] , and Blum and Hartline [9] also consider the "full information" version of the problem, or what we call the online auction problem, where the valuations of the buyers are revealed to the algorithm a er the buyer has made a decision. Such information may be available in a context where the buyers have to bid for the items, and are awarded the item if their bid is above a hidden price. In this case, the additive term can be improved to O (ϵ −1 h log(ϵ −1 )), which is tight. Once again, we show that h can be replaced with p * ; in particular, we show that the additive term can be made to be O (ϵ −1 p * log(hϵ −1 )).
Purely multiplicative bounds and sample complexity
e regret bounds mentioned above can be turned into a purely multiplicative factor in the following way: for any ϵ > 0, the algorithm is guaranteed to get a 1 − O (ϵ ) fraction of the best xed price revenue, provided the number of periods T ≥ E/ϵ, where E is the additive term in the regret bounds above. is follows from the observation that a revenue of T is a lower bound on the best xed price revenue. Call the number of periods required to get a 1 − ϵ multiplicative approximation (as a function of ϵ) as the convergence rate of the algorithm.
A 1 − ϵ multiplicative factor is also the target in the recent line of work on the sample complexity of auctions started by Cole and Roughgarden [12] , Dhangwatnotai et al. [16] . (We give a more comprehensive discussion of this line of work in Section 1.3.) Here, i.i.d. samples of the valuations are given from a xed but unknown distribution, and the goal is to nd a price such that its revenue w.r.t. the hidden distribution is a 1 − ϵ fraction of the optimum revenue for this distribution. e sample complexity is the minimum number of samples needed to guarantee this (as a function of ϵ). e sample complexity and the convergence rate (for the full information se ing) are closely related to each other. e sample complexity is always smaller than the convergence rate: the problem is easier because of the following.
(1) e valuations are i.i.d. in case of sample complexity whereas they can be arbitrary (worst case) in case of convergence rate.
(2) Sample complexity corresponds to an o ine problem: you get all the samples at once.
Convergence rate corresponds to an online problem: you need to decide what to do on a given valuation without knowing what valuations arrive in the future.
is is formalized in terms of an online to o ine reduction [folklore] which shows that a convergence rate upper bound can be automatically translated to a sample complexity upper bound. is lets us convert sample complexity lower bounds into lower bounds on the convergence rate, and in turn into lower bounds on the additive error E in an additive + multiplicative regret bound. E.g., 1 Standard bounds allow regret to depend on the loss of the best action instead of the worst case loss. However, even such bounds still depend linearly on the range of the losses, and thus they would not allow to replace h by the best xed price. the additive error for the online auction problem (and hence also for the posted pricing problem 2 ) cannot be o(hϵ −1 ) [19] . Moreover, it is insightful to compare convergence rates we show with the best known sample complexity upper bound; proving be er convergence rates would mean improving these bounds as well.
A natural target convergence rate for a problem is therefore the corresponding sample complexity, but achieving this is not always trivial. An interesting version of the sample complexity bound for auctions did not have an analogous convergence rate bound. is version takes into account both revenue and market share, and surprisingly, gets sample complexity bounds that are scale free; there is no dependence on h, which means it works for unbounded valuations! For any δ ∈ (0, 1), the best xed price benchmark is relaxed to ignore those prices whose market share (or equivalently probability of sale) is below a δ fraction; as δ increases the benchmark is lower. is is a meaningful benchmark since in many cases revenue is not the only goal, even if you are a monopolist. A more reasonable goal is to maximize revenue subject to the constraint that the market share is above a certain threshold. What more, this gives a sample complexity of O (ϵ −2 δ −1 log(δ −1 ϵ −1 )) [19] . In fact δ can be set to h −1 without loss of generality, when the values are in [1, h] , 3 and the above bound then matches the sample complexity w.r.t. the best xed price revenue. In addition, this bound gives a precise interpolation: as the target market share δ increase, the number of samples needed decreases almost linearly.
e second contribution of this paper is to show a convergence rate that almost matches the above sample complexity, for the full information setting. We have a mild dependence on h; the rate is proportional to log log h. Further, we also show a near optimal convergence rate for the posted pricing problem. 4 Multiple buyers: All of our results in the full information (online auction) se ing extend to the multiple buyer model. In this model, in each time period, a new set of n buyers compete for a single item. e seller runs a truthful auction that determines the winning buyer and his payment. e benchmark here is the set of all "Myerson-type" mechanisms. ese are mechanisms that are optimal when each period has n buyers of potentially di erent types, and the value of each buyer is drawn independently from a type dependent distribution. In fact, our convergence rates also imply new sample complexity bounds for these problems (except that they are not computationally e cient). e various bounds and comparison to previous work are summarized in Tables 1 and 2.
Multi-scale online learning
e main technical ingredients in our results are variants of the classical problems of learning from expert advice and multi-armed bandit. We introduce the multi-scale versions of these problems, where each action has its reward bounded in a di erent range. Our third contribution is to give an algorithm for this problem whose regret w.r.t. a certain action scales with the range of rewards for that particular action. To contrast, the regret bounds in the standard versions scale with the maximum range. We expect such bounds to be of independent interest. e multi-scale versions of these problems exhibit subtle variations that don't appear in the standard versions. First of all, our applications to auctions and pricing has non-negative rewards, and this actually makes a di erence. For both the expert and the bandit versions, the minimax regret bounds for non-negative rewards are provably be er than those when rewards could be negative. Further, for the bandit version, we can prove a be er bound if we only require the bound Online posted pricing Ω max{ h
Online multi buyer auction 
Online multi buyer auction Ω 1 ϵ 2 δ * -Õ n ϵ 3 δ * Huang et al. [19] ; † Kleinberg and Leighton [20] . to hold w.r.t. the best action, rather than all actions (for non-negative rewards). e various regret bounds and comparison to standard bounds are summarized in Tables 3.
Standard regret bound O (·)
Multi-scale bound (this paper)
Upper bound O (·)
Lower bound Ω(·)
c min * Freund and Schapire [17] ; † Auer et al. [4] . Table 3 . Pure-additive regret bounds for non-negative rewards, i.e. when reward of any action i at any time is in [0, c i ], and symmetric range rewards, i.e. when reward of any action i at any time is in [−c i , c i ] (suppose T is the time horizon, A is the actions set, and k is the number of actions).
We use algorithms based on online (stochastic) mirror descent (OSMD) [11] , with a weighted negative entropy as the Legendre function.
is framework gives regret bounds in terms of a "local norm" as well as an "initial divergence", which we then bound di erently for each version of the problem. In the technical sections we highlight how the subtle variations arise as a result of di erent techniques used to bound these two terms.
Other related work
e online pricing problem, also called dynamic pricing, is a much studied topic, across disciplines such as operations research and management science [26] , economics [24] , marketing, and of course computer science. e multi-armed bandit approach to pricing is particularly popular. See den Boer [13] for a recent survey on various approaches to the problem.
Kleinberg and Leighton [20] consider the online pricing problem, under the assumption that the values are in [0, 1], and considered purely additive factors. ey showed that the minimax additive regret isΘ(T 2/3 ), where T is the number of periods. is is similar in spirit to regret bounds that scale with h, since one has to normalize the values so that they are in [0, 1]. e ner distinction about the magnitude of the best xed price is absent in this work. Recently, Syrgkanis [25] also consider the online auction problem, with an emphasis on a notion of "oracle based" computational e ciency. ey assume the values are all in [0, 1] and don't consider the scaling issue that we do; this makes their contribution orthogonal to ours.
Starting with Dhangwatnotai et al. [16] , there has been a spate of recent results analyzing the sample complexity of pricing and auction problems. Cole and Roughgarden [12] and Devanur et al. [14] consider multiple buyer auctions with regular distributions (with unbounded valuations) and give sample complexity bounds that are polynomial in n and ϵ −1 , where n is the number of buyers. Morgenstern and Roughgarden [21] consider arbitrary distributions with values bounded by h, and gave bounds that are polynomial in n, h, and ϵ −1 . Huang et al. [19] , Roughgarden and Schrijvers [23] give further improvements on the single-and multi-buyer versions respectively; tables 1 and 2 give a comparison of these results with our bounds, for the problems we consider. e dynamic pricing problem has also been studied when there are a given number of copies of the item to sell (limited supply) [1, 5, 6, 8] . ere are also variants where the seller interacts with the same buyer repeatedly, and the buyer can strategize to in uence his utility in the future periods [2, 15] .
MODEL AND MAIN RESULTS
We consider a variety of online algorithmic problems that are all parts of the multiscale online learning framework. We start by de ning this framework and expressing our results in terms of action-speci c regret bounds for this general problem. Next, we investigate di erent auction design problems that are covered by this framework, and show how to get multiplicative cum additive approximations for these problems by the help of the multi-scale learning framework. We then consider competing with δ -guarded benchmarks and show how our algorithms get pure multiplicative approximations with respect to these benchmarks. We can then translate the convergence rate of our online algorithms to sample complexity of auctions to 1) generalize many sample complexity upper-bounds to the online adversarial auction se ings, 2) compare our bounds with the known sample complexity lower-bounds, and 3) design new algorithms achieving near-optimal sample complexity bounds for the o ine Bayesian auction problem.
Multi-scale online learning framework
Our multi-scale online learning framework is basically the classical learning from expert advice problem (under full-information) or multi-armed bandit problem (under partial-information). e ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation, Vol. 1, No. 1, Article 1. Publication date: January 2017.
Session 7a: Dynamic Revenue Maximization 2 EC'17, June 26-30, 2017, Cambridge, MA, USA main di erence is that the range of di erent experts/arms could be di erent. Suppose there is a set of actions A. e problem proceeds in T rounds, and in each round t ∈ [T ] : 5 • e algorithm picks an action i t ∈ A • e adversary picks a reward function g(t ) simultaneously, where action i has reward i (t ). • e algorithm gets the reward i t (t ). • In the full information se ing, the algorithm sees the entire reward function g(t ). In the bandit se ing, the algorithm sees only its own reward, i t (t ). e total reward of the algorithm is denoted by
e standard "best xed action" benchmark is
We consider both full-information and the bandit se ing:
• Multi-scale experts: e action set is countable. If the action set is nite of size k, we
is revealed to the algorithm a er round t. • Multi-scale bandit learning: e same as before, in the bandit se ing.
We prove action-speci c regret bounds, which we call also multi-scale regret guarantees. Towards this end, we de ne the following quantities.
e regret bound w.r.t. action i, i.e., an upper bound on E [ i ], depends on the range c i , as well as any prior distribution π over the action set A; this way, we can handle countably many actions. Let c min = inf i ∈A c i and c max = sup i ∈A c i (if applicable) be the minimum and the maximum range. We rst state a version of the regret bound which is parameterized by ϵ > 0; such bounds are stronger than √
T type bounds which are more standard. T 2.1. ere exists an algorithm for the multi-scale experts problem that takes as input any distribution π over A, the ranges c i , ∀ i ∈ A, and a parameter 0 < ϵ ≤ 1, and satis es:
Compare this to what you get by using the standard analysis for the experts problem [3] , where the second term in the regret bound is O 1 ϵ log(k ) ·c max . Choosing π to be the uniform distribution in the above theorem gives O 1 ϵ log k ϵ · c i . Also, one can compare the pure-additive version of this bound with the classic pure-additive regret bound O c max · T log(k ) for the experts problem by se ing ϵ = log(kT ) T (Corollary 2.2). C 2.2. ere exists an algorithm for the multi-scale experts problem that takes as input the ranges c i , ∀ i ∈ A, and satis es:
For the bandit version, we can get a similar regret guarantee, but only for the best action. If we require the regret bound to hold for all actions, then we can only get a weaker bound, where the second term has ϵ −2 instead of ϵ −1 . e di erence between the bounds for the bandit and the full information se ing is essentially a factor of k, which is unavoidable.
3. ere exists an algorithm for the online multi-scale bandits problem that takes as input the ranges c i , ∀ i ∈ A, and a parameter 0 < ϵ ≤ 1, and satis es,
• for all i ∈ A, 2.4. ere exist algorithms for the online multi-scale bandits problem that satis es,
• For all i ∈ A,
Online auction design
e auction design problems that we consider are as follows.
• Online single buyer auction: e action set A = [1, h] . e reward function is such that the adversary picks a value (t ) ∈ [1, h] and for any price i ∈ A, the reward
is is the full information se ing, where the value (t ) is revealed to the algorithm a er round t.
• Online posted pricing: e same as above, in the bandit se ing. e algorithm only learns the indicator function 1( (t ) ≥ i t ) where i t is the price it picks in round t. • Online multi buyer auction: e action set is the set of all "Myerson-type" mechanisms for n buyers, for some n ∈ N. (See De nition 5.1.) e adversary picks a valuation vector v(t ) ∈ [1, h] n and the reward of a mechanism M is its revenue when the valuation of the buyers is given by v(t ); this is denoted by M (v(t )). e algorithm sees the full vector of valuations v(t ). We show how to get a multiplicative cum additive approximations for these problems with G as the benchmark,à la Blum and Hartline [9] , Blum et al. [10] . e main improvement over these results is that the additive term scales with the best price rather than h. Let p * be the best xed price on hindsight, which is the price that achieves G . T 2.5. ere are algorithms for the online single buyer auction, online posted price auction, and the online multi buyer auction problems that take as input a parameter ϵ > 0, and satsify
where respectively (for the three problems mentioned above)
Even if h is not known upfront, we can still get the similar approximation guarantee for online single buyer auction and online multi buyer auction with:
Bounds on the sample complexity of auctions imply that the rst bound in this theorem is tight up to log factors: the lower bound is hϵ −1 in an instance where p * = h, and the best upper bound known is hϵ −1 log(1/ϵ ). We conjecture that our bound for the online posted pricing problem is tight up to log factors, and leave resolving this as an open problem. e third bound is not comparable to the best sample complexity for the multi buyer auction problem by Roughgarden and Schrijvers [23] ; it is be er than theirs for large ϵ (when 1/ϵ ≤ o(nh)), and is worse for smaller ϵ (when 1/ϵ ≥ ω (nh)). Also, compare these to the corresponding upper bounds for the rst two problems by Blum and Hartline [9] , Blum et al. [10] , which are respectively
Competing with δ -guarded benchmarks
For the single buyer auction/pricing problem, we de ne a δ -guarded benchmark, for any δ ∈ [0, 1]. is benchmark is restricted to only those prices that sell the item in at least a δ fraction of the rounds.
G
As observed in Footnote 3, one can replace δ with 1/h and get the corresponding guarantees for G rather than G (δ ). However, the main point of these results is to show a graceful improvement of the bounds as δ is chosen to be larger.
Multiple buyers: For the multi buyer auction problem, we de ne the δ -guarded benchmark as follows. For any sequence of value vectors v(1), v(2), . . . , v(T ), letV denote the largest value such that there are at least δT distinct v(t )'s with max i ∈[n] i (t ) ≥V . De ne the δ -guarded benchmark to be
where the min is to be understood to be applied co-ordinate wise, and the max is over all Myersontype mechanisms.
We focus on purely multiplicative approximation factors when competing with G (δ ). In particular, for any given ϵ > 0, we are interested in a 1 − ϵ approximation. We state our results in terms of the convergence rate. We say that T (ϵ, δ ) is the convergence rate of an algorithm if for all time horizon T ≥ T (ϵ, δ ), we are guaranteed that G ≥ (1 − ϵ )G (δ ). Our main results are as follows.
T 2.6. ere are algorithms for the online single buyer auction, online posted pricing, and the online multi buyer auction problems with convergence rates respectively of
Even if h is not known upfront, we can still get the following similar convergence rates for online single buyer auction and online multi buyer auction respectively:
Once again, we compare to the sample compexity bounds: our rst is within a log log h factor of the best sample complexity upper bound in Huang et al. [19] . e lower bound for the online single buyer auction is Ω(δ −1 ϵ −2 ), which is also the best lower bound known for the pricing and the multi-buyer problem. 6 For the online posted pricing problem, we conjecture that the right dependence on ϵ should be ϵ −3 . No sample complexity bounds for the multi-buyer problem were known before; in fact we introduce the de nition of a δ -guarded benchmark for this problem.
2.4
Multi-scale online learning with symmetric range e standard analysis for the experts and the bandit problems holds even if the range of i (t ) is [−c i , c i ], rather than [0, c i ] as we have assumed. In contrast, there are subtle di erences on the best acheivable multi-scale regret bounds between the non-negative and the symmetric range. We rst show the following upper bound for the full information se ing when the range is symmetric. is bounds follows the same style of action-speci c regret bounds as in eorem 2.1. More detailed discussion on how the choice of initial distribution π a ects the bound is deferred to the full version due to space constraint. T 2.7. ere exists an algorithm for the multi-scale experts problem with symmetric range that takes as input any distribution π over A, the ranges c i , ∀ i ∈ A, and a parameter 0 < ϵ ≤ 1, and satis es: 
If we compare the above regret bound with the standard O (c max T log k ) regret bound for the experts problem, we see that we replace the dependency on c max in the standard bound with c i log( c max c min ). It is natural to ask whether we could get rid of the dependence on log(c i /c min ) and show regret bound of O (c i T log k ), like we did for non-negative rewards. However, the next theorem shows that this dependence on log(c i /c min ) in the above bound is necessary, in a weak sense: where the constant in the O (·) is universal and does not depend on the ranges c i . is is because the lower bound only holds for "small" values of the horizon T , which nonetheless grows with the c i s. 7 T 2.9. ere exists an action set of size k, and ranges c i , ∀i ∈ [k], and time horizon T , such that for all algorithms for the online multi-scale experts problem with symmetric range, there is a sequence of T gain vectors such that
We then show the following upper bound for the bandit se ing when the range is symmetric. is bound also follows the same style of action-speci c regret bounds as in eorem 2.3. 6 Cole and Roughgarden [12] show that at least a linear dependence on n is necessary when the values are drawn from a regular distribution, but as is, their lower bound needs unbounded valuations. e lower bound probably holds for "large enough h" but it is not clear if it holds for all h. 7 For this reason we chose not to include this bound in Table 3 . . ere exists an algorithm for the multi-scale bandits problem with symmetric range that takes as input the ranges c i , ∀ i ∈ A, and a parameter 0 < ϵ ≤ 1/2, and satis es:
Also, similar to Section 2.1, we can compute the pure-additive version of the bound in eo- 2.11. ere exists an algorithm for the online multi-scale bandits problem with symmetric range that satis es:
Once again, for the bandit problem, the following theorem shows that this bound cannot be improved beyond log factors (to get a guarantee like that of eorem 2.3, for instance). , such that for all algorithms for the online multi-scale bandit problem with symmetric range, for all su ciently large time horizon T , there is a sequence of T gain vectors such that
Organization. We start in Section 3 by showing regret upper bounds for the multi-scale experts problem with non-negative rewards ( eorem 2.1). e corresponding upper bounds for the bandit version are in section 4 ( eorem 2.3). In Section 5 we show how the multi-scale regret bounds ( eorems 2.1 and 2.3) imply the corresponding bounds for the auction/pricing problems ( eorems 2.5 and 2.6). Finally, the regret (upper and lower) bounds for the symmetric range are deferred to the full version due to space constraints ( eorems 2.7, 2.9, 2.10, and 2.12).
MULTI-SCALE ONLINE LEARNING WITH FULL INFORMATION
In this section, we look at the full information multi-scale learning problem, in which di erent experts have di erent ranges. We exploit this structure to achieve expert-speci c regret bounds.
Here is a map of this section. In Section 3.1 we propose an algorithm that exploits the aforementioned structure, and later in Section 3.2 we show how this algorithm is an online mirror descent with weighted negative entropy as the Legendre function. For reward-only instances, we prove the regret bound without dependency on log(c i /c max ) in Section 3.3.
Multi-Scale Multiplicative-Weight (MSMW) algorithm
We propose the "Multi-Scale Multiplicative-Weight" (MSMW) algorithm as a multiplicative-weight update style learning for our problem. e algorithm is presented in Algorithm 1. e main idea behind this algorithm is taking into account di erent ranges for di erent experts, and therefore (1) Normalizing reward of each expert accordingly, i.e. dividing the reward of expert i by c i .
(2) Projecting the updated weights accordingly, by performing a smooth multi-scale projection into the simplex that will be described later.
Equivalence to Online Mirror Descent (OMD) with weighted negative entropy
While it is possible to analyze the regret of MSMW algorithm (Algorithm 1) by using rst principles (Look at the proof of Lemma 3.7 in the appendix, Section ), we take a di erent approach . We Randomly pick an action drawn from p(t ), and observe g(t ).
5:
∀i ∈ A : w i (t + 1) ← p i (t ) · exp(η · i (t ) c i ).
6:
Find λ * (e.g., binary search)
show how this algorithm is indeed an instance of Online Mirror Descent (OMD) algorithm for a particular choice of Legendre function.
Preliminaries on online mirror descent.
Fix an open convex set D and its closureD, which in our case are R A >0 and R A + respectively, and a closed-convex action set A ⊂D, which in our case is ∆ A , i.e. the set of all probability distributions over experts in A. At the heart of an OMD algorithm there is a Legendre function F :D → R, i.e. a strictly convex function that admits continuous rst order partial derivatives on D and lim x →D\D ∇F (x ) = +∞, where ∇F (.) denotes the gradient map of F . One can think of OMD as a member of projected gradient descent algorithms, where the gradient update happens in the dual space ∇F (D) rather than in primal D, and the projection is de ned by using the Bregman divergence associated with F rather than 2 -distance.
De nition 3.1 (Bregman Divergence [11] ). Given a Legendre function F over ∆ A , the Bregman divergence associated with F , denoted as D F : [11] ). Suppose F is a Legendre function. At every time t ∈ [T ], the online mirror descent algorithm with Legendre function F selects an expert drawn from distribution p(t ), and then updates w(t ) and p(t ) given rewards g(t ) by:
De nition 3.2 (Online Mirror Descent

Gradient update:
∇F (w(t + 1)) = ∇F (p(t )) + η · g(t ) ⇒ w(t + 1) = (∇F ) −1 (∇F (p(t )) + η · g(t )) (13) Bregman projection:
where η > 0 is called the learning rate of OMD.
We use the following standard regret bound of OMD (Refer to [11] for a thorough discussion on OMD. For completeness, a proof is also provided in the appendix, Section ). L 3.3. For any learning rate parameter 0 < η ≤ 1 and any benchmark distribution q over A, the OMD algorithm with Legendre function F (.) admits the following:
3.2.2 MSMW algorithm as an OMD. For our application, we focus on a particular choice of Legendre function that captures di erent learning rates proportional to c −1 i for di erent experts, as we saw earlier in Algorithm 1. We start by de ning the weighted negative entropy function. 
. We now have the following lemma that shows Algorithm 1 is indeed an OMD algorithm. L 3.6. e MSMW algorithm, i.e. Algorithm 1, is equivalent to an OMD algorithm associated with the weighted negative entropy F (x ) = i ∈A c i · x i ln(x i ) as its Legendre function.
P
. Look at the gradient update step of OMD, as in Equation (13), with Legendre transform F (x ) = i ∈A c i · x i ln(x i ). By using Corollary 3.5 we have
and therefore, w i (t + 1) = p i (t ) · exp(η · i (t ) c i ). Moreover, for Bregman projection step we have
is is a convex-minimization over a convex set. To nd a closed form solution, we look at the Lagrangian dual function L(p, λ)
and the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions ∇L(p * , λ * ) = 0. We have
As i ∈A p * i = 1, λ * should be unique number s.t. i ∈A w i (t + 1) · exp(− λ * c i ) = 1, and then p i (t + 1) = w i (t + 1) · exp(− λ * c i ). So, Algorithm 1 is equivalent to OMD with weighted negative entropy as its Legendre transform. L 3.7. For any initial distribution µ over A, and any learning rate parameter 0 < η ≤ 1, and any benchmark distribution q over A, the MSMW algorithm satis es that:
3.3 Regret bound for non-negative rewards -proof of Theorem 2.1 P T 2.1. Suppose i min is an action with the minimum c i . Let µ = (1−η)·1 i min +η·π , and let q = (1−η) ·1 i +η ·π in Lemma 3.7. If i i min , we get that (note that µ j = q j for any j i, i min ):
By 1 ≥ q i > µ i ≥ ηπ i , the 2nd term on the RHS is upper bounded as: Similarly, by 1 ≥ µ i min > q i min ≥ 0, the 3rd term on the RHS is upper bounded as
Finally, note that G j ≥ 0 for all j ∈ A in reward-only instances. So the LHS is lower bounded by
Pu ing together we get that
e theorem then follows by choosing η = ϵ 3 and rearranging terms.
MULTI SCALE ONLINE LEARNING WITH BANDIT FEEDBACK
In this section, we look at the bandit feedback version of multi scale online learning. Inspired by online stochastic mirror descent algorithm, we introduce Bandit-MSMW algorithm. Our algorithm follows the standard bandit route of using unbiased estimators for the rewards in a full information strategy (in this case MSMW). We also mix the MSMW distribution with an extra uniform exploration, and use a tailored initial distribution for our multi-scale learning se ing.
Here is a map of this section. In Section 4.1 we propose our bandit algorithm and prove its general regret guarantee for non-negative rewards. en in Section 4.2 we show how to get a multi-scale style regret guarantee for the best arm c i * , and a weaker guarantee for all arms {c i } iA .
Bandit Multi-Scale Multiplicative Weight (Bandit-MSMW) algorithm
We present our Bandit algorithm (Algorithm 2) when the set of actions A is nite (with |A| = k). Let η be the learning rate and γ be the exploration probability. We show the following regret bound. 
5:
Randomly pick an expert i t drawn fromp(t ), and observe i t (t ).
6:
Letg(t ) be such that˜
8:
Find λ * (e.g., binary search) 
In expectation over the randomness of the algorithm, we have:
(2) G j = E G j for any j ∈ A.
Hence, to upper bound
, it su ces to upper bound E G i − G . By the de nition of the probability that the algorithm picks each arm, i.e.,p(t ), we have:
Hence, we have that for any initial distribution q over A:
Next, we upper bound the 1st term on the RHS. Note that p(t )'s are the probability of choosing experts by MSMW when the experts have rewardsg(t )'s. By Lemma 3.7, we have that for any benchmark distribution q over S, the Bandit-MSMW algorithm satis es that:
For any t ∈ [T ] and any j ∈ A, by the de nition of˜ j (t ), it equals j (t ) p j (t ) with probabilityp j (t ), and equals 0 otherwise. us, if we x the random coin ips in the rst t − 1 rounds and, thus, x p(t ), and take expectation over the randomness in round t, we have that:
Further note thatp j (t ) ≥ (1 − γ )p j (t ), and j (t ) ≤ c j , the above is upper bounded by 1 1−γ j (t ) ≤ 2 j (t ). Pu ing together with (20) , we have that for any 0 < η ≤ γ n :
Combining with (19) , we have: 
Further, the LHS is lower bounded as:
e lemma then follows by pu ing it back to (21) and rearranging terms. 
AUCTIONS AND PRICING 5.1 Auctions and pricing as multi-scale online learning problems
Online single buyer auction and posted pricing. Recall that in each round, the algorithm chooses an action, i.e., a price, p t ∈ [1, h]; the adversary picks a value (t ) ∈ [1, h]; and the algorithm collects reward p t (t ) = p t · 1( (t ) ≥ p t ). In order to obtain a 1 − ϵ approximation of the optimal revenue, it su ces to consider prices of the form (1 + ϵ ) j for 0 ≤ j ≤ log 1+ϵ h = O ( log h ϵ ). As a result, we reduce the online single buyer auction problem and the online posted pricing problem to a multi-sclae online learning problem with full information and bandit feedback respectively with k = O ( log h ϵ ) actions whose ranges form a geometric sequence (1 + ϵ ) j , 0 ≤ j < k.
Online multi buyer auction. In multi buyer auctions, we consider the set of all discretized Myersontype auctions as the action space. We start by de ning Myerson-type auctions:
De nition 5.1 (Myerson-type auctions). A Myerson-type auction is de ned by n non-decreasing virtual value mappings ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ n :
. Given a value pro le 1 , . . . , n , the item is given to the bidder j with the largest virtual value ϕ j ( j ). en, bidder j pays the minimum value that would keep him as the the winner.
Myerson [22] shows that when the bidders' values are drawn from independent (but not necessarily identical) distributions, the revenue-optimal auction is a Myerson-type auction. Devanur et al. [14, Lemma 5] observe that to obtain a 1 − ϵ approximation, it su ces to consider the set of discretized Myerson-type auctions that treat each bidder's value as if it is equal to the closest power of 1 + ϵ from below. As a result, it su ces to consider the set of discretized Myerson-type auctions, each of which is de ned by the virtual values of (1 + ϵ ) j 's, i.e., by O (n log h/ϵ ) real numbers ϕ ((1 + ϵ ) j ), for ∈ [n], and 0 ≤ j ≤ log 1+ϵ h . Devanur et al. [14] , Gonczarowski and Nisan [18] further note that a discretized Myerson-type auction is in fact completely characterized by the total ordering of ϕ ((1 + ϵ ) j )'s; their actual values do not ma er. Indeed, both the allocation rule and the payment rule are determined by the ordering of virtual values. As a result, our action space is a nite set with at most O ((n log h/ϵ )!) actions. e range of an action, i.e., a discretized Myerson-type auction, is the largest price ever charged by the auction, i.e., the largest value of the form (1 + ϵ ) j such that there exists ∈ [n], ϕ ( ) > ϕ ((1 + ϵ ) −1 ).
Proof of Theorem 2.5
P
. Online single buyer auction. Recall the above formulation of the problem as an online learning problem with full information. e case when h is known then follows by eorem 2.1, le ing π be the uniform distribution over the k = O (log h/ϵ ) actions, i.e., discretized prices.
When h is not known upfront, we consider a countably in nite action space comprised of all prices of the form (1 + ϵ ) j , for j ≥ 0. en, let the prior distribution π be such that for any price p = (1+ϵ ) j , π p = ϵ (1+ϵ ) −j−1 = ϵ 1+ϵ · 1 p . e approximation guarantee then follows by eorem 2.1.
Online posted pricing. Recall the above formulation of the problem as an online learning problem with bandit feedback. is part then follows by eorem 2.3 with k = O (log h/ϵ ) actions.
Online multi buyer auction. Recall the above formulation of the problem as an online learning problem with full information. e case when h is known then follows by eorem 2.1, where we let π be the uniform distribution over the k = O ((n log h/ϵ )!) actions, i.e., Myerson-type auctions.
When h is not known upfront, we consider a countably in nite action space A as follows. For any p = (1 + ϵ ) j , j ≥ 0, let the k p = O ((n log p/ϵ )!) Myerson-type auctions for values in [1, p] be in A; we assume these auctions treat any values greater than p as if they were p. Further, we choose the prior distribution π such that the probability mass of each auction for range [1, p] is equal to ϵ 1+ϵ · 1 p · 1 k p . e approximation guarantee then follows by eorem 2.1.
Proof of Theorem 2.6
P . Online single buyer auction. When h is known, by eorem 2.1, le ing π be the uniform distribution over the k = O (log h/ϵ ) actions, i.e., discretized prices, we have that for any price p (recall that c p = p):
For the δ -guarded optimal price p * (i.e., subject to selling in at least δT rounds), we have G p * ≥ δT ·p * . erefore, when T ≥ O log(log h/ϵ )/ϵ 2 δ , the additive term of the above approximation guarantee is at most ϵ · G p * . So the theorem holds. e treatment for the case when h is not known upfront is essentially the same as in eorem 2.5. We consider a countably in nite action space comprised of all prices of the form (1 + ϵ ) j , for j ≥ 0. en, let the prior distribution π be such that for any price p = (1 + ϵ ) j , π p = ϵ (1 + ϵ ) −j−1 = ϵ 1+ϵ · 1 p .
Online posted pricing. Recall the above formulation of the problem as an online learning problem with bandit feedback. By eorem 2.3 with k = O (log h/ϵ ) actions, we have that for any price p:
Again, for the δ -guarded optimal price p * (i.e., subject to selling in at least δT rounds), we have G p * ≥ δT · p * . erefore, when T ≥ O log h log log h/ϵ /ϵ 4 δ , the additive term of the above approximation guarantee is at most ϵ · G p * . So the theorem holds.
Online multi buyer auction. Suppose i * is the δ -guarded best Myerson-type auction. Recall that V is the largest value such that there are at least δT distinct (t )'s with max ∈[n] (t ) ≥V . So we may assume without loss of generality that i * does not distinguish values greater thanV . Hence: c i * ≤V .
Further, note that running a 2nd-price auction with anonymous reserveV is a Myerson-type auction (e.g., mapping values less thanV to virtual value −∞ and values greater than or equal tō V to virtual valueV ), and it gets revenue at least δT ·V . So we have that:
Finally, the above implies that to obtain a 1−ϵ approximation, it su ces to consider prices that are at least ϵδV . Hence, it su ces to consider Myerson-type auctions that, for a givenV , do not distinguish among values greater thanV , and do not distinguish among values smaller than ϵδV . ere are O (log h/ϵ ) di erent values ofV . Further, givenV , there are only O (log(1/ϵδ )/ϵ ) distinct values to be considered and, thus, there are at most O ((n log(1/ϵδ )/ϵ )!) distinct Myerson-type auctions of this kind. Hence, the total number of distinct Myerson-type actions that we need to consider is at most:
When h is known, le ing π be the uniform distribution over the k actions in eorem 2.1, we have that (recall Eqn. (22)):
When T ≥ O n log (1/ϵ δ ) log(n log(1/ϵ δ )/ϵ )
, the additive term of the above approximation guarantee is at most ϵ · G i * due to Eqn. (23) . So the theorem holds.
Again, the treatment for the case when h is not known upfront is similar to that in eorem 2.5. When h is not known upfront, we consider a countably in nite action space A as follows. For anȳ V = (1 + ϵ ) j , j ≥ 0, let the k = O ((n log(1/ϵδ )/ϵ )!) Myerson-type auctions that do not distinguish among values greater thanV , and do not distinguish among values smaller than ϵδV be in A. Further, we choose the prior distribution π such that the probability mass of each Myerson-type auction for a givenV is equal to ϵ 1+ϵ · 1 V · 1 k . e approximation guarantee then follows by eorem 2.1 and essentially the same argument as the known h case.
Remark. Devanur et al. [14] show that when the values are drawn from independent regular distributions, the ϵ-guarded optimal is a 1 − ϵ approximation of the unguarded optimal. So our convergence rate for the online multi buyer auction problem in eorem 2.1 implies aÕ (nϵ −4 ) sample complexity modulo a mild log log h dependency on the range, almost matching the best known sample complexity upper bound for regular distributions.
